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 In Alexandria at some point in the early third century BC, Herophilus of Chalcedon 
identified the nerves as a distinct system within the body, traced their origins to the brain, and 
recognised their role in transmitting sensation and voluntary motion. His discovery was based 
on dissection and vivisection, not only of animals, but also of human beings. Herophilus’ 
younger contemporary Erasistratus also integrated these findings into his rather bolder 
physiology. The implications of this discovery were of course wide-ranging. From a modern 
perspective, it is now widely celebrated as having established, for the first time on something 
like a scientific basis, that the brain has more or less the functions that we now ascribe to it. 
Likewise, in antiquity, Galen relied heavily on Herophilus’ discovery in his proof that the 
rational soul is located in the brain. As we shall see, it also had an impact on Stoic 
psychology. What exactly Herophilus and Erasistratus saw as its implications, however, is a 
different question, and the difficulties in answering it are considerable given the state of the 
evidence.1  
 The Aëtian Placita tradition reports that Herophilus and Erasistratus each had answers 
to the question of the location of the hēgemonikon:2 
On the hēgemonikon. Plato and Democritus [say that it is] in the whole head. Strato 
[says that it is] in the ‘mid-brow’. Erasistratus [says that it is] in the membrane of the 
brain, which he calls the epikranis. Herophilus [says that it is] in the cavity of the 
brain, which is also its base. … etc. 
The membrane mentioned in the Erasistratean entry presumably refers to both the pia and 
dura mater together, which he certainly distinguished.3 In the Herophilean report, the ‘base’ 
of the brain refers to the cerebellum. These testimonia have been highly influential in recent 
assessments of the broader theoretical contexts in which the newly discovered nervous 
system played a role for these doctors.4  
                                                 
1 The fragments of Herophilus and Erasistratus are collected in von Staden 1989 and Garofalo 1988 
respectively. 
2 Ps.-Plut. Plac. 4.5, Περὶ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ. (1) Πλάτων Δημόκριτος ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ κεφαλῇ. (2) Στράτων ἐν 
μεσοφρύῳ. (3) Ἐρασίστρατος περὶ τὴν μήνιγγα τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου, ἣν ἐπικρανίδα λέγει. (4) Ἡρόφιλος ἐν τῇ τοῦ 
ἐγκεφάλου κοιλίᾳ, ἥτις ἐστὶ καὶ βάσις ... See too Theodoret 5.22, ὅσα δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ χώρας 
διηνέχθησαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ῥᾴδιον διαγνῶναι. (1) Ἱπποκράτης μὲν γὰρ καὶ Δημόκριτος καὶ Πλάτων ἐν 
ἐγκεφάλῳ τοῦτο ἱδρῦσθαι εἰρήκασιν. (2) ὁ δὲ Στράτων ἐν μεσοφρύῳ. (3) Ἐρασίστρατος δὲ ὁ ἰατρὸς περὶ τὴν 
τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου μήνιγγα, ἣν καὶ ἐπικρανίδα λέγει. (4) Ἡρόφιλος δὲ ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου κοιλίᾳ ... Tert. DA 15.5 
and Cael. Aur. Cel. Pass. 1.8.53 offer additional witnesses to the Placita reports. For a detailed overview of the 
Placita tradition on this question, see Mansfeld (1990), 3092-108. 
3 See below on Erasistratus’ anatomy of the brain. The term ἐπικρανίς attributed to Erasistratus here has been 
suspected by some, but I do not think that the emendation suggested by Diels 1879: 207-9, is warranted.  
4 E.g. von Staden 2000: 87, ‘Herophilus’ remarkable anatomical explorations ... not only allowed him to confirm 
that the brain is the centre of all psychic activity, as several predecessors had claimed, but also to specify more 
precisely than any precursor the location of the soul’s central “ruling part”’; Cambiano 1999: 601, ‘Thanks to 
this (dissection) Herophilus was able to observe the ventricles of the brain and to show in one of these the site of 
the central psychic organ’; Solmsen 1961: 192-3, ‘[Erasistratus] evidently, like Herophilus, placed the 
hegemonikon or organ of thought in the cerebellum.’ 
 In this paper, however, I shall argue that the Placita testimonia on Herophilus and 
Erasistratus are significantly misleading in a number of ways. A closer look at the remaining 
evidence reveals a rather more complicated picture, and there are indications that their 
particular concerns were in some respects different from what has often been assumed. 
Specifically, I shall try to show that neither doctor singled out the brain or its meninges as the 
location of the hēgemonikon, as the Placita testimonia tell us, and that in fact they did not 
have a theory of a hēgemonikon at all. The functioning of the human body for them involved 
complex processes spanning multiple organs and mediated by multiple fluids. Voluntary 
motion and sensation were only two among a wider array of fundamental physiological 
functions; other, no less fundamental, functions were also closely associated with the heart. 
Nor do mental phenomena such as rational thought, memory, emotions, etc., appear to have 
been associated with the brain or its meninges, or indeed any bodily organ. The functions 
which were associated with the nerves (and through them the brain or its meninges) were all 
thought to be mediated by the physical substance of pneuma, but there is no sign that 
Herophilus and Erasistratus attempted to account also for other mental functions. Such 
functions, I shall suggest, may have been thought to belong properly to the soul, and as such 
were of questionable relevance to the medical art, at least according to Herophilus and 
Erasistratus. The reports on their views regarding the hēgemonikon will have arisen, not from 
their original writings, but from Chrysippus’ response to the physiology of the nervous 
system in his treatise On the Soul. Chrysippus will have addressed the nervous system only 
insofar as it had a bearing on the question of the location of the hēgemonikon. The fact that 
this Stoicising version of Herophilus and Erasistratus’ views has in some ways been taken at 
face value is perhaps also connected to a tendency to assimilate early Alexandrian neurology 
too readily to a modern understanding of the brain.  
 I shall begin by examining the evidence we have for Herophilus’ and Erasistratus’ 
analysis of the brain and nervous system separately, before attempting to assess the general 
character of their theories and their principal concerns. I shall also consider the degree to 
which they believed that the inquiry into the soul and its interaction with the body properly 
belonged to the medical art at all. The subsequent section will take a close look at how 
Chrysippus responded to the physiology of the nervous system in his treatise On the Soul, and 
will argue that his discussion is a plausible source for the erroneous attribution to Herophilus 
and Erasistratus of opinions on the location of the hēgemonikon. Finally, I shall consider how 




 Studies by Friedrich Solmsen and Heinrich von Staden have put it beyond reasonable 
doubt that Herophilus was indeed the first to isolate the nerves as a distinct anatomical 
structure within the body, and to ascertain their function in mediating both sensation and 
voluntary motion.5 He regarded the nerves, however, as basically similar to the various cords, 
tendons and ligaments for which the term neuron had previously been used, but differentiated 
them by their sensory and motor function. This is attested for example by Rufus of Ephesus: 
‘according to Herophilus, some neura are voluntary <and sensory?>, which grow from the 
brain and spinal marrow, while some grow from bone to bone, others from muscle to muscle, 
                                                 
5 See esp. Solmsen 1961 and von Staden 1989: 159-60. 
which also bind together the joints’.6 Galen refers to the same division of types of neuron, 
where he probably has Herophilus in mind: ‘but if you want to confuse the names, as most 
have done since Hippocrates’ time, call them all neura but say that there is a three-fold 
distinction among them, those from the brain and spinal cord being sensory and voluntary, 
those without sensation being ligamentous, and third, in addition to these, are those that grow 
from the muscles as they become cord-like’.7 The focus on specifically voluntary motion, that 
is, motion κατὰ προαίρεσιν (literally ‘in accordance with choice’) stems from Herophilus’ 
recognition, as we shall see, of the separate, natural motion involved in such phenomena as 
the arterial pulse, which is not under our control.8 
 As for the brain, Herophilus distinguished its four ventricles, and believed that the one 
in the cerebellum has greatest significance: ‘Those who consider this cavity [sc. the fornix] to 
be a fourth ventricle say that, of all the ventricles in the entire brain, it is most dominant. 
Herophilus, however, seems to think that not this ventricle, but the one in the cerebellum 
(parenkephalis), is more dominant’.9 This of course immediately recalls the Placita reports 
which have Herophilus locating the hēgemonikon ‘in the ventricle of the brain, which is its 
base’. Nonetheless, Galen is not suggesting here that the ventricle in the cerebellum is the 
most important part of the body, but only that it is more important than the brain’s other 
ventricles. 
 It is a crucial point for understanding the subsequent debate that, as noted, Herophilus 
used the term neuron, not only for what we would recognise as nerves, but also for the 
various other ‘cord-like’ structures in the body, such as tendons and ligaments. The confusion 
this has caused is certainly regrettable, but Herophilus may well have had good reasons for 
using the same term for all such structures. Direct continuity between the nerves, tendons and 
ligaments seems to have been envisioned. Galen describes the composition of such structures 
as follows: ‘the nerve in each muscle separates into fibres and mixes and intertwines with the 
fibres from the ligaments, and then a single nerve-like structure, the product of their union, 
grows out from the body of the muscle, the so-called tendon’.10 It seems plausible that this 
idea of tendons being made of nerve fibres fused together with ligamentous tissue could, in 
its essentials, go back to Herophilus. Galen attributes to him the concept of a ‘nerve-like’ or 
perhaps better ‘tendon-like class’ (τὸ νευρῶδες γένος) of bodily parts, which included the 
nerves, ligaments and tendons: all were of the same type.11 In what follows, I shall reserve 
the term ‘nerves’ for what modern biology would recognise as nerves; otherwise, I shall 
speak of neura in general. 
                                                 
6 Herophilus T81 von Staden = Rufus of Ephesus, Anatomy of the parts of the body 75 [pp. 184-185 Daremberg-
Ruelle], κατὰ δὲ τὸν Ἡρόφιλον ἃ μέν ἐστι προαιρετικά <καὶ αἰσθητικὰ (?)>, ἃ καὶ ἔχει τὴν ἔκφυσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ 
ἐγκεφάλου καὶ νωτιαίου μυελοῦ, καὶ ἃ μὲν ἀπὸ ὀστοῦ εἰς ὀστοῦν ἐμφύεται, ἃ δὲ ἀπὸ μυὸς εἰς μῦν, ἃ καὶ συνδεῖ 
τὰ ἄρθρα. 
7 Gal. PHP 1.9.10 [p. 96 de Lacy], εἰ δὲ καὶ συγχεῖν βούλοιο τὰς προσηγορίας ὡς οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν μεθ’ 
Ἱπποκράτη, κάλει μὲν ἅπαντα νεῦρα, διαφορὰς δὲ ἐν αὐτοῖς λέγε τριττάς, αἰσθητικὰ μὲν καὶ προαιρετικὰ τὰ ἐξ 
ἐγκεφάλου καὶ νωτιαίου πεφυκότα, συνδετικὰ δὲ τὰ ἀναίσθητα, καὶ τρίτα ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις τὰ ἐκ τῶν μυῶν 
ἀπονευρουμένων φυόμενα, after de Lacy. 
8 A similar terminological distinction is made, for example, by Aristotle, at PA 657a 37-b 1, on non-voluntary 
blinking to prevent things getting in the eyes: καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἀλλ’ ἡ φύσις ἐποίησε.  
9 T78 [T138] von Staden = Galen, De Usu Partium 8.11 [i 484 Helmreich], καὶ οἷς γε τετάρτη τις αὕτη κοιλία 
νενόμισται, κυριωτάτην εἶναί φασιν αὐτὴν ἁπασῶν τῶν καθ’ ὅλον τὸν ἐγκέφαλον. Ἡρόφιλος μὴν οὐ ταύτην, 
ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐν τῇ παρεγκεφαλίδι κυριωτέραν ἔοικεν ὑπολαμβάνειν. 
10 PHP 1.10.14 [p. 98 de Lacy], λυόμενον γὰρ εἰς ἶνας ἐν ἑκάστῳ μυῒ τὸ νεῦρον ἀναμίγνυταί τε καὶ διαπλέκεται 
ταῖς ἐκ τῶν συνδέσμων ἰσίν, εἶτα ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἕν τι νευρῶδες σῶμα γεννηθὲν ἐκφύεται τοῦ σώματος <τοῦ> μυὸς ὁ 
προσαγορευόμενος τένων, trans. de Lacy. 
11 See von Staden 1989: 255-6.  
 A key issue here is how Herophilus analysed the nervous system’s basic functions of 
mediating perception and voluntary motion in the broader context of human physiology. How 
exactly did these fit in with the body’s other functions? According to an offhand remark 
made by Galen, Herophilus believed that there are four capacities (δυνάμεις) which regulate 
living things:12 
 Then they (i.e. Archigenes and his followers) inquire which cause moves the arteries, 
 and they omit nothing Herophilus wrote on this; but when his theories make a 
 difference for the practice of the art, they no longer mention at all whether what 
 Herophilus wrote is correct or incorrect. For God’s sake, wouldn’t it be much better 
 not to inquire about the fact that four capacities were said by Herophilus to govern 
 living beings, or to argue bitterly and to speak against him concerning those things at 
 least, but rather, if they did wish to revile and refute him for talking idle nonsense, to 
 mention such of his views as are clearly in conflict with what is evident? 
This specific number of four is striking. Unfortunately, however, only one of these capacities 
is clearly identified in our sources. The passage quoted is important for context: the physician 
Archigenes and his followers13 are being criticised by Galen for getting embroiled in 
tangential and arbitrarily chosen doctrinal disputes with Herophilus over pulsation. Galen 
makes it clear that they had attacked Herophilus’ basic analysis of four capacities specifically 
in relation to the question of what causes arterial motion. Our evidence, though scanty, offers 
some indication of why they should have done so. Herophilus believed that the arteries, being 
continuous with the heart, dilate thanks to a capacity which flows from it throughout their 
coats.14 But the Aëtian Placita identifies in Herophilus’ theory a basic ‘motive capacity’ 
(κινητικὴ δύναμις) which is responsible not only for arterial motion, but also for the motion 
associated with neura and muscles; to quote: ‘Herophilus recognises a motive capacity in 
bodies, in the neura, arteries and muscles’.15 The hypothesis that this motive capacity 
represented one of the four fundamental capacities would also immediately explain why 
Archigenes, in the restricted context of arterial motion, should have discussed the general, 
fourfold division of capacities which regulate living things. Thus Archigenes’ discussion will 
have begun from Herophilus’ positing a fundamental motive capacity as part of his 
explanation of arterial motion, and moved from there to criticism of his overall account of the 
                                                 
12 T184 von Staden, after von Staden, εἶτα τίς μὲν ἡ κινοῦσα τὰς ἀρτηρίας αἰτία ζητοῦσι καὶ τῶν εἰς τοῦθ’ 
Ἡροφίλῳ γεγραμμένων οὐδὲν παραλείπουσι, τῶν δ’ εἰς τὰ ἔργα τῆς τέχνης διαφερόντων θεωρημάτων, οὔτ’ εἰ 
καλῶς οὔτ’ εἰ μὴ καλῶς ἔγραψεν Ἡρόφιλος, οὐδενὸς ἔτι μέμνηνται· ὦ πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, οὐ πολὺ μέντοι βέλτιον 
ἦν μὴ περὶ τοῦ τέτταρας ὑφ’ Ἡροφίλου λέγεσθαι τὰς διοικούσας τὰ ζῷα δυνάμεις ζητεῖν, μηδὲ πικρῶς ἐρίζειν τε 
καὶ ἀντιλέγειν αὐτῷ περί γε τούτων, ἀλλ’ εἴπερ ἐβούλοντο καταβάλλειν τε καὶ διεξελέγξαι αὐτὸν εἰκῇ 
ληροῦντα, τῶν τοιούτων αὐτοῦ μνημονεύειν, ἃ φανερῶς τοῖς ἐναργέσι μάχεται; Soranus independently uses the 
same terminology in another Herophilean testimonium, in a way which tends to confirm this analysis of 
regulating faculties as a core aspect of Herophilus’ theory, at T193 von Staden: ‘In his Midwifery Herophilus 
says that the uterus is woven from the same things as the other parts and regulated by the same faculties (ὑπὸ 
τῶν αὐτῶν δυνάμεων διοικεῖσθαι)’. Cf. also Anon. Lond. xxii 36-xxii 49. 
13 For the identification of Galen’s opponents as the followers of Archigenes, see earlier at Dig. Puls. 2.2 [8.853 
K.], where Archigenes is named as the doctor who states that the pulse of a child is small, like those later at 
T184 von Staden just before the passage quoted. 
14 T144 von Staden, τοῖς δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἡρόφιλον ἀρέσκει τὰς ἀρτηρίας συνεχεῖς οὔσας τῇ καρδίᾳ διὰ τῶν 
χιτώνων ἐπιρρέουσαν ἔχειν τῆν παρ’ αὐτοῖς δύναμιν, ᾗ χρώμεναι παραπλησίως αὐτῇ τῇ καρδίᾳ διαστελλόμεναι 
μὲν ἕλκουσι πανταχόθεν, ὅθεν ἂν δύνωνται, τὸ πληρῶσον αὐτῶν τὴν διαστολήν. See also T145a, T155 von 
Staden, with von Staden 1989: 270-1. Herophilus’ teacher Praxagoras, by contrast, believed that the arteries 
themselves had their own innate and independent faculty to pulsate: Praxagoras frr. 9-10 Lewis = fr. 28 Steckerl 
= Gal. Diff. Puls. viii 702 K. and PHP 6.7 [p. 404-6 de Lacy]; see Lewis 2016: 222-9 for discussion. 
15 T143b von Staden, Ἡρόφιλος δὲ δύναμιν ἀπολείπει περὶ τὰ σώματα κινητικὴν ἐν νεύροις καὶ ἐν ἀρτηρίαις καὶ 
ἐν μυσί. 
four capacities. It is easy to see why Galen might have objected to Archigenes’ misguided 
choice of target, especially since, from Galen’s point of view, there were more glaringly 
mistaken aspects of Herophilus’ doctrine which Archigenes apparently left untouched – such 
as his refusal to acknowledge that children have a small pulse, which is the subject of the 
discussion in the immediate context of Galen’s complaint here. 
 So it seems clear that a motive capacity was one of the four fundamental capacities in 
Herophilus’ analysis of human functioning. However, Herophilus introduced a subdivision, 
positing different kinds of motion in the animal body, transmitted by different means. Within 
the motive capacity, he distinguished two types: voluntary (or prohaeretic) motion, and 
natural motion. Natural motion included arterial pulsation, whereas voluntary motion was 
carried out by the nerves (and through them the ligaments, tendons, and muscles). This 
opposition between natural and voluntary motion is clearly set out in another Herophilean 
testimony. According to the author of a Synopsis on Pulses, possibly Rufus of Ephesus, 
Herophilus believed that:16 
 ... the pulse at all times attends us involuntarily (ἀπροαιρέτως), since it also exists 
 naturally (φυσικῶς), whereas the others (i.e. palpitation, spasm, tremor) obey our 
 volition (προαιρέσει), when the parts are pushed outwards often and depressed. 
Hence, in identifying the nerves as mediators only of voluntary motor function, Herophilus 
was forced to offer a different account of the non-voluntary motions in the body: as we have 
seen, the pulsation of the heart and arteries was due to their own innate, ‘natural’ faculty.  
 According to Herophilus, voluntary motion functions by means of the pneuma that 
flows through the nervous system.17 This pneuma is derived ultimately from respiration, as 
confirmed by a chapter from Aëtius’ Placita on whether the foetus is an animal:18 
 ... Herophilus recognises only natural motion (κίνησιν φυσικήν) in foetuses, not 
 pneumatic. (He thinks that) the nerves are responsible for motion; and that (foetuses) 
 become animals at the point when, having been brought forth, they take in some air.  
Foetuses cannot be classed as animals since they possess only natural motion, and not the 
pneumatic motion that is taken to characterise this class of living being. Given Herophilus’ 
distinction between natural motion and voluntary motion elsewhere, it makes excellent sense 
to identify this pneumatic motion with voluntary motion, which was certainly transmitted by 
the nerves, and to take this voluntary type of motion as the criterion that separates animals 
                                                 
16 T149 von Staden = Rufus (?), Synopsis on Pulses 2 [p. 221 Daremberg-Ruelle], καὶ τὸν μὲν σφυγμὸν 
ἀπροαιρέτως ἡμῖν πάντοτε παρακολουθεῖν, ἐπεὶ καὶ φυσικῶς ὑπάρχει, ταῦτα δὲ εἶναι καὶ ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ 
προαιρέσει, ἀποπιεσθέντων πολλάκις καὶ βαρυνθέντων τῶν μερῶν. 
17 Von Staden 1989: 257, and 2000: 89, is doubtful concerning the presence of pneuma in the motor nerves, 
based on a passage in T141 von Staden = Gal. Trem. Palp. 5 [vii 605-6 K.], where Galen criticises Herophilus 
for not recognising that ‘the body of the nerves is not itself the cause of motion but rather its instrument, 
whereas its moving cause is the faculty which extends through the nerves. Here I reproach him for not having 
distinguished faculty from instrument’. Von Staden argues at 1989: 257, that ‘[i]f Galen’s criticism is accepted 
as valid, Herophilus attributed voluntary motion to the motor nerves, ligaments, tendons, and muscles ..., but did 
not introduce another faculty or medium such as motor pneuma’. But this rests on a conflation in what von 
Staden refers to as the ‘faculty or medium such as motor pneuma’: while pneuma can be a medium, it cannot be 
a faculty. So Galen cannot have been talking about pneuma at all in Herophilus’ account here, its absence or 
otherwise, and therefore this passage does nothing to cast doubt on the conclusion drawn from other testimonia 
that Herophilus’ motor nerves contain pneuma. 
18 T202 von Staden = Aët. Plac. 5.15.5, εἰ τὸ ἔμβρυον ζῷον· ... Ἡρόφιλος κίνησιν ἀπολείπει φυσικὴν τοῖς 
ἐμβρύοις, οὐ πνευματικήν· τῆς δὲ κινήσεως αἴτια νεῦρα· τότε δὲ ζῷα γίνεσθαι, ὅταν προχυθέντα προσλάβῃ τι 
τοῦ ἀέρος. 
from lower classes of living being.19 The point here must be that although foetuses have a 
nervous system, it is not active since it has not yet been filled by the pneuma drawn from 
respiration, which first occurs at birth. Hence they cannot move themselves deliberately, as 
animals do, yet they certainly possess the natural motion of pulsation, and presumably the 
various other motions which foetuses can be observed to make in utero – for Herophilus, 
these must have been involuntary. 
 For present purposes, the main thing to observe is that the motive capacity, present 
only in the arteries, neura and muscles, was subdivided into two types of motion, each with a 
distinct source: voluntary motions, mediated by the nervous system, originate in the brain, 
while natural motions begin in the heart. 
 As noted, we have no direct evidence naming the other three fundamental capacities 
in Herophilus’ physiology, and any suggestions must remain entirely speculative. 
Nevertheless, given that Herophilus assigned perceptual function as well as voluntary motion 
to the nervous system, the inclusion of a fundamental perceptive capacity in his system looks 
like an obvious possibility. Its origin he would presumably have located in the brain, insofar 
as the nerves issue from there. Similarly, the fundamental importance of the digestive process 
to medical accounts of human physiology and pathology might recommend a nutritive 
capacity as another of Herophilus’ four. Possible connections with Aristotelian biology, 
according to which living creatures are characterised principally by nutritive, locomotive, 
perceptive and intellective capacities, may offer further support for these particular 
suggestions. Whatever the case, however, the fundamental importance of the heart must have 
been recognised. The Anonymus Londinensis papyrus reports that Herophilus believed 
nutrition to occur by means of blood transmitted mostly through the arteries and to a lesser 
degree through the veins.20 For Herophilus, the arterial system, and possibly also the venous, 
originated in the heart.21 The importance, especially diagnostic, which the pulse held in his 
medical system would certainly have emphasised the significance of the heart.22  
 It is also worth emphasising that Herophilus undertook a comparative anatomy of 
humans with various animal species. In fact, it seems likely that the availability of human 
bodies will have been highly restricted, and the majority of his dissections may have been 
carried out on animals.23 But any phenomena connected with the nervous system that 
Herophilus might have observed in his dissection and vivisection of human beings would 
have been equally observable in animals. The nervous system’s responsibility for voluntary 
motion and perception, each transmitted by pneuma, will have been the same across human 
                                                 
19 Others have suggested (cf. von Staden 1989: 257-8), on the other hand, that ‘pneumatic motion’ might 
alternatively refer merely to respiration, but this ignores Herophilus’ attested distinction between types of 
motion. Nor does it make sense of the argument, since it would no longer be clear why foetuses should be 
disqualified as animals: as Aristotle had observed, not all animals respire (e.g. Resp. 1, 470b 9-10). For 
deliberate motion as a unique capacity of animals, see e.g. Pl. Tim. 77b-c; Arist. DA 2.3, 414a 29-b 2; ibid. 3.9, 
432b 8-19; Gal. Nat. Fac. 1.1 [ii 1 K.]. Herophilus believed that the lungs do not themselves partake of the 
motive capacity, but merely ‘grasp at’ dilation and contraction, according to T143 von Staden = Aët. Plac. 
4.22.3. 
20 T146 von Staden = Anon. Lond. xxviii 46-49 [p. 66 Manetti], ὁ μέντοι γε Ἡρόφιλος ἐναντίως διείλη|φ̣ε̣[ν]· 
ο̣ἴ̣ε̣τ̣α̣[ι] γ̣(ὰρ) πλείονα μ(ὲν) γί(νεσ)θ(αι) ἀνάδοσιν | ἐ̣ν τ̣αῖς ἀρτηρίαις, ἥσσο̣να̣ δὲ ἐν | ταῖς φλεψὶ διὰ δύο 
ταῦτ[α]· (‘Herophilus, however, has taken the opposite view. For he thinks greater distribution (of nourishment) 
occurs through the arteries and less through the veins for the following two reasons’). 
21 Galen reports that Herophilus felt at a loss as to which organ should come first in his exposition of the venous 
system (T115 von Staden = Gal. PHP 6.5.22 [CMG V 4, 1, 2 p. 392 de Lacy]).  
22 See von Staden 1989: 262-88 for Herophilus’ views on the pulse. 
23 See von Staden 1989: 140 and n. 3, 158-9, 179: Herophilus regularly referred to animal anatomy alongside 
that of humans, and his anatomy of the rete mirabile must be based on an ungulate. 
and animal species. It is not surprising, then, that our evidence shows no sign of any interest 
on Herophilus’ part in the physiology of higher rational functions, such as thinking, memory, 
etc. 
 Herophilus’ conception of the functioning of animals was a highly complex one, 
comprising processes which spanned multiple organs and vessel systems. There were four 
fundamental capacities, one of which was the motive. The motive capacity itself 
encompassed different forms of motion: ‘natural’ motion, such as the arterial pulse, had its 
origins in part of the heart, while voluntary motion was mediated by nerves arising from 
within the brain. But these major organs played only a partial role within system-wide 
processes. The lungs and thorax, for example, were responsible for drawing in the pneuma 
and distributing it to the nervous system, which then transmitted sensation and voluntary 
motion. The media by which these capacities functioned varied considerably too: fluid 
substances, such as blood and pneuma, were required for mediating processes involved in 
nutrition, voluntary motion and sensation, while other types of bodily motion could be 
transmitted directly, through a natural capacity, to solid anatomical structures such as the 
arteries. These various processes were clearly integrated, with the different systems closely 
interacting, and their malfunction of course led to the pathological phenomena which it was 
the doctor’s job to correct.  
 
Erasistratus  
 Erasistratus’ physiology was based on the interaction between three principal systems 
in the body, the arterial, venous and nervous.24 Each had its own origin, proper fluid content, 
and distinct functions: the arterial system originated in the heart’s left ventricle and naturally 
contained only ‘vital’ pneuma; the venous originated in the heart’s right ventricle and 
naturally contained only blood; and the nervous system had its source apparently in the 
brain’s meninges, and contained only ‘psychic’ pneuma. The arterial system was responsible 
for basic physiological functions such as digestion, the venous system for transmitting 
nutriment, and the nervous system for transmitting voluntary motion and perception, just as 
Herophilus believed. These three systems, which Erasistratus apparently referred to as a 
triplokia, or ‘threefold network’, permeated the entire living body, while the remaining 
organs, bones, etc., formed its basic structure, to which Erasistratus gave the general term 
‘parenchyma of nutriment’. 
 For Erasistratus, as for Herophilus, the pneuma which is contained in the arterial and 
nervous systems is ultimately derived from breathing. According to his physiology, air or 
pneuma passes into the lungs and from there into the heart; then the heart pumps the pneuma 
from its left ventricle throughout the arterial system, including the carotid arteries which lead 
to the head. Some of this ‘vital’ pneuma thus makes its way into the nerves and there 
becomes the ‘psychic’ pneuma with which we sense and move ourselves voluntarily. 
According to Galen, Erasistratus believed that it is specifically in the brain’s meninges that 
the transfer of pneuma takes place between the ends of the arteries and the beginnings of the 
nerves:25 
                                                 
24 For Erasistratus’ physiology, see esp. Lonie 1964; Harris 1973: 195-233; Garofalo 1988: 22-58; Vallance 
1990: 62-79; Vegetti 1998; von Staden 1997 and 2000: 92-6; and Leith 2015a. 
25 Fr. 112 Garofalo = Gal. Ut. Resp., after Furley, ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἐκ τῆς εἰσπνοῆς ὁμοίως οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἐρασίστρατον 
τοῖς <περὶ τὸν> Ἱπποκράτην τρέφεσθαί φασι τὸ ψυχικὸν πνεῦμα· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἐκ καρδίας διὰ τῶν ἀρτηριῶν ἐπὶ 
τὰς μήνιγγας, τοῖς δὲ εὐθὺς διὰ τῶν ῥινῶν εἰς τὰς κατὰ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον κοιλίας ἔρχεσθαι τὸ πνεῦμα δοκεῖ. 
 But Erasistratus and his followers do not say that the psychic pneuma is nourished by 
 what is breathed in, in the same way as do Hippocrates and his followers. For to the 
 former the pneuma appears to come from the heart through the arteries to the 
 meninges (of the brain), to the latter, to come directly through the nostrils into the 
 ventricles in the brain.  
It is worth comparing Aristotle’s contrast between the presence of blood vessels in the brain’s 
meninx and their absence in the brain itself.26 Galen also specifies that, in Erasistratus’ view, 
loss of motor function is caused by damage to the brain’s meninges, rather than to any 
underlying structures.27 Likewise Erasistratus maintained that phrenitis and lethargy, which 
involve impairment to motor and sensory capacities, are affections of the brain’s meninges, 
plausibly again because they involve blockages or other interferences with the normal 
transmission of pneuma there.28 All this obviously also aligns well with the Placita testimony 
that he located the hēgemonikon in the meninges.  
 So it may be that, for Erasistratus, the brain itself contributed little to perceptual and 
motor function. This would also conform easily to his conception of brain matter as a 
parenchyma of nutriment. This parenchyma is a sort of fleshy or fatty filling found in 
between, and distinct from, the three primary vessel systems.29 Elsewhere in Erasistratus’ 
physiology, the parenchyma which forms other organs plays no active role, merely providing 
a structure for the various vessels of the body, and acting as a container or conduit for the 
different fluids passing through it. Hence the brain matter itself is not part of the three main 
functional systems. Such a conception of the brain should warn against taking Erasistratus’ 
views as anticipating in any straightforward sense the findings of modern neurology.  
However, Galen on a different occasion claims that Erasistratus had in fact revised his 
earlier view that the nerves issue from the meninges, and late in life came to see the brain 
                                                 
26 Arist. HA 1.16, 495a 4-9, ἄναιμος δ’ ὁ ἐγκέφαλος ἅπασι, καὶ οὐδεμίαν ἔχων ἐν αὑτῷ φλέβα ... . ἡ δὲ περὶ 
αὐτὸν μῆνιγξ φλεβώδης· ἔστι δ’ ἡ μῆνιγξ ὑμὴν δερματικὸς ὁ περιέχων τὸν ἐγκέφαλον (‘In all animals the brain 
is bloodless; there is not a single blood vessel in it ... . The membrane which surrounds it is patterned with blood 
vessels: this is the skin-like one which surrounds the brain’, trans. Peck). 
27 Fr. 42 Garofalo = Gal. PHP 7.3.32-33 (v 609-10 K. = p. 446 de Lacy) καί τις ἄλλος εἷς ἀζυγὴς ἐμβάλλει τῇ 
πρώτῃ γενέσει τοῦ νωτιαίου, καθ’ ὃ μέρος μάλιστα τῆς παχείας μήνιγγος τρωθείσης ὁ πόρος ὅλος γίγνεται 
γυμνὸς ἅμα τῷ πέρατι τῆς ὄπισθεν ἐγκεφάλου κοιλίας, ὅπερ οὐχ ἥκιστα τὸν Ἐρασίστρατον ἠπάτησεν, ὡς 
οἰηθῆναι διὰ τὴν τῆς μήνιγγος τρῶσιν ἀκίνητον αὐτίκα γίγνεσθαι τὸ ζῷον· ἑώρα γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν πρῶτον 
σπόνδυλον τιτρωσκομένων βοῶν ἅμα τῷ διαιρεθῆναι τὴν μήνιγγα ἀκίνητον αὐτίκα τὸ ζῷον γινόμενον. ἀλλ’ οὐ 
τῷ πάθει τῆς μήνιγγος, ἀλλὰ τῷ γυμνοῦσθαι τὴν ὀπίσω κοιλίαν γίγνεται τοῦτο (‘Another passage, which is 
single and unpaired, empties into the first beginning of the spinal medulla; and here especially, when the dura 
mater is cut at this point, the entire passage is laid bare, along with the end of the posterior ventricle of the brain. 
This was not the least reason why Erasistratus mistakenly believed that the animal immediately becomes 
motionless when the meninx is cut; for he saw that oxen wounded at the first vertebra become motionless as 
soon as the meninx is severed. But this results not from the injury to the meninx but from the exposure of the 
posterior ventricle’, trans. de Lacy). 
28 Frr. 176-7 Garofalo = Anon. Paris. Morb. Ac. et Chron. 1.1.1, 2.1.1 [pp. 2, 10 Garofalo]. 
29 Fr. 86 Garofalo = ps.-Gal. Int. 9.3-4 [14.697-8 K. = p. 21 Petit], καὶ Ἐρασίστρατος δὲ ὡς ἀρχὰς καὶ στοιχεῖα 
τοῦ ὅλου σώματος ὑποτιθέμενος τὴν τριπλοκίαν (or τριπλέκειαν) τῶν ἀγγείων, νεῦρα καὶ φλέβας καὶ ἀρτηρίας 
... . πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα σωμάτων εἴδη εὑρίσκεται, οὐκ ἐκ τῆς τριπλοκίας (or τριπλεκείας) συγκείμενα, οἷον 
εὐθὺς ὁ ἐγκέφαλος καὶ ὁ μυελὸς καὶ πάντα τὰ ὀστᾶ. τὸν μὲν οὖν ἐγκέφαλον ἢ τὸν μυελὸν παρέγχυμα τροφῆς 
τολμᾷ λέγειν, ὡς τὴν πιμελὴν, καὶ τοῦ ἥπατος καὶ σπληνὸς καὶ πνεύμονος τὴν σύστασιν (‘Erasistratus posited as 
principles and elements of the whole body the triple web of vessels, that is the nerves, veins and arteries ... And 
many other kinds of bodies are found which are not composed of the triple web, such as, for example, the brain, 
the marrow, and all the bones. So he dared to call the brain and marrow a parenchyma of nutriment, just like fat 
and the substance of the liver, spleen and lungs’). 
itself as their source. Galen makes it clear elsewhere that his claim is a controversial 
interpretation of Erasistratus’ position that he himself developed:30 
 Erasistratus, who for a long time saw only the outer part of the nerve, (the part) that 
 comes from the dura mater, thought that the whole nerve grows from that source, and 
 most of his writings are full of statements that the nerves grow from the meninx that 
 encloses the brain. But when, late in life and at leisure to devote himself entirely to 
 the study of the art, he performed his dissections with greater care, he recognised also 
 that the heart-wood,31 so to speak, of the nerves grows from the brain. He writes as 
 follows: “We viewed the structure of the cerebrum, and it was bipartite, as in the other 
 animals, and there were ventricles lying there, elongated in form. The ventricles were 
 united by a perforation at the point of contact of the parts. From this point a passage 
 led to the so-called cerebellum, where there was another small ventricle. Each of the 
 parts had been partitioned off by the meninges. For the cerebellum had been 
 partitioned off by itself, and also the cerebrum, which is similar to the jejunum and 
 has many folds; and the cerebellum, even more than the cerebrum, was provided with 
 many varied convolutions. So the observer learns from these that as it is in the other 
 animals – deer, hare and any other that far excels the rest in running being well 
 provided with the muscles and sinews useful for this activity –, so in man, since he is 
 far superior to the other animals in thinking, this (member) is large and has many 
 folds. And the outgrowths of the nerves were all from the brain; and speaking 
 generally the brain appears to be the source of the nerves in the body. For the 
 sensation that comes from the nostrils passed to this through apertures, and also the 
 sensations that come from the ears. And outgrowths from the brain went also to the 
 tongue and the eyes.” In these words Erasistratus admits that he then saw clearly a 
 thing that he had not known earlier, that each nerve grows from the brain. And he 
 wrote accurately about its four ventricles, which he had also failed to see the year 
 before. 
Now in the quotation Erasistratus certainly speaks of the nature of the brain in relation to 
humans’ superior capacity for thinking (διανοεῖσθαι), and refers to the outgrowths of the 
                                                 
30 Fr. 289 Garofalo = Gal. PHP 7.3.6-12 [v 602-4 K. = pp. 440-2 de Lacy], after de Lacy: Ἐρασίστρατος δ’ ἄχρι 
πολλοῦ τὴν ἔξωθεν μοῖραν ὁρῶν μόνην τοῦ νεύρου τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς παχείας μήνιγγος ὁρμωμένην, ἀπ’ ἐκείνης ᾤετο 
πεφυκέναι σύμπαν τὸ νεῦρον καὶ μεστά γε τὰ πλεῖστα τούτου τῶν συγγραμμάτων ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τῆς περιεχούσης 
τὸν ἐγκέφαλον μήνιγγος πεφυκέναι φάσκοντος τὰ νεῦρα. ἀλλ’ ὅτε πρεσβύτης ὢν ἤδη καὶ σχολὴν ἄγων μόνοις 
τοῖς τῆς τέχνης θεωρήμασιν ἀκριβεστέρας ἐποιεῖτο τὰς ἀνατομάς, ἔγνω καὶ τὴν οἷον ἐντεριώνην τῶν νεύρων 
ἀπ’ ἐγκεφάλου πεφυκυῖαν. ἔχει δ’ ἡ ῥῆσις αὐτοῦ τόνδε τὸν τρόπον· “ἐθεωροῦμεν δὲ καὶ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ 
ἐγκεφάλου καὶ ἦν ὁ μὲν ἐγκέφαλος διμερής, καθάπερ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ζῴων, καὶ κοιλίαι παραμήκεις τῷ εἴδει 
κείμεναι· συντέτρηντο δ’ αὗται εἰς μίαν κατὰ τὴν συναφὴν τῶν μερῶν· ἐκ δὲ ταύτης ἔφερεν εἰς τὴν ἐπεγκρανίδα 
καλουμένην καὶ ἐκεῖ ἑτέρα ἦν μικρὰ κοιλία. διαπέφρακτο δὲ ταῖς μήνιγξιν ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν· ἥ τε γὰρ 
ἐπεγκρανὶς διεπέφρακτο αὐτὴ καθ’ ἑαυτὴν καὶ ὁ ἐγκέφαλος παραπλήσιος ὢν νήστει καὶ πολύπλοκος, πολὺ δ’ 
ἔτι μᾶλλον τούτου ἡ ἐπεγκρανὶς πολλοῖς ἑλιγμοῖς καὶ ποικίλοις κατεσκεύαστο. ὥστε μαθεῖν <ἐκ> τούτων τὸν 
θεωροῦντα ὅτι ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ζῴων, ἐλάφου τε καὶ λαγωοῦ καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο κατὰ τὸ τρέχειν πολύ τι τῶν 
λοιπῶν ζῴων ὑπεραίρει τοῖς πρὸς ταῦτα χρησίμοις εὖ κατεσκευασμένον μυσί τε καὶ νεύροις, οὕτω καὶ 
ἀνθρώπῳ, ἐπειδὴ τῶν λοιπῶν ζῴων πολὺ τῷ διανοεῖσθαι περίεστι, πολὺ τοῦτ’ ἔστι <καὶ> πολύπλοκον. ἦσαν δὲ 
καὶ ἀποφύσεις τῶν νεύρων αἱ πᾶσαι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου, καὶ καθ’ ὅλον εἰπεῖν ἀρχὴ φαίνεται εἶναι τῶν κατὰ τὸ 
σῶμα ὁ ἐγκέφαλος. ἥ τε γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ῥινῶν γιγνομένη αἴσθησις συντέτρητο ἐπὶ τοῦτον καὶ αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ὤτων. 
ἐφέροντο δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν γλῶσσαν καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἀποφύσεις ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου.” ἐν τούτοις ὁ 
Ἐρασίστρατος ὁμολογεῖ τὸ πρότερον ἀγνοούμενον ἑαυτῷ σαφῶς ἑωρακέναι τηνικαῦτα, τῶν νεύρων ἕκαστον ἐξ 
ἐγκεφάλου φυόμενον. ἀκριβῶς δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν τεττάρων αὐτοῦ κοιλιῶν ἔγραψεν, ἃς οὐδ’ αὐτὰς ἔτει τῷ 
πρότερον εἶδεν. 
31 On the fact that ‘heart-wood’ is Galen’s term, and implies nothing about Erasistratus’ views on the 
hollowness of the nerves, see Solmsen 1961: 188-90. 
nerves as coming from the brain. I shall argue presently, however, that care is needed in 
interpreting these statements, and that there are further contextual details that must to be 
taken into account, so I shall leave the content of the Erasistratean quotation aside for a brief 
moment, and concentrate on how Galen presents his claim. Firstly, despite what he says 
about it, Erasistratus offers no hint in the passage quoted that what he is stating constitutes a 
revision of an earlier position that he adopted. There is no reference to any alternative views 
at all. Moreover, Galen is elsewhere more forthcoming about just how controversial his 
interpretation of Erasistratus’ position is. In his Commentary on Aphorisms, we learn that the 
Erasistrateans themselves failed to take account of the fact that their founder had changed his 
mind about the origin of the nerves. In fact, they continued to adhere to the view that other 
sources attribute to Erasistratus himself, namely that the meninges are the source of the 
nerves. As Galen tells us:32 
 The Erasistrateans, since they posit the meninges as the origins of the nerves, will say 
 that because of its own nature the thick meninx (i.e. dura mater) brings about these 
 symptoms (i.e. fever and vomiting bile) when it alone has been pierced. But if the 
 piercing should reach to the brain, they will say that the generation of the 
 aforementioned affections follows in this way, namely by the piercing of both 
 meninges first. I said that the Erasistrateans will say this, and not Erasistratus himself, 
 since when he was an old man, at the time when they themselves say that he wrote the 
 books On Divisions, he declared that the brain was the origin of the nerves. I have 
 spoken in greater detail on this in the books On Hippocrates’ Anatomy.  
This passage also confirms, which might be expected in any case, that Erasistratus’ followers 
had access to the relevant work, On Divisions, in which Erasistratus allegedly recanted his 
position, yet they evidently saw no reason to revise their own views in light of this. 
Moreover, it seems that Galen’s knowledge of the relative chronology of Erasistratus’ 
writings was due to the Erasistrateans, rather than to anything in Erasistratus’ works directly 
available to Galen himself. So Galen accuses them of holding a view on the origin of the 
nerves that was different from their master’s. 
 At this point in PHP, of course, it is to Galen’s advantage to have Erasistratus on side. 
Galen is reviewing his proof, based on the anatomy of the brain and nervous system, that the 
rational soul is located within the brain. In second century AD Rome, Erasistratus’ 
acknowledged authority in anatomy could be a problem if he had in fact denied that the brain 
was the origin of the nerves at all, but would obviously add weight to Galen’s case if he had 
been in agreement. Perhaps most significantly, Galen is also engaged here in a personal 
dispute with a contemporary Erasistratean physician named Martialis, against whom the (lost) 
treatise On Hippocrates’ Anatomy, explicitly mentioned in the passage above, was directed. 
As Galen states in his treatise On my Own Books , ‘<When (Martialis) learned that I praised 
Hippocrates, he announced that Hippocrates was> not at all <a subject of anatomical study 
for him,> and he declared the superiority of Erasistratus in all areas of the art, but especially 
in this. So it was because of him that I wrote the six books On Hippocrates’ Anatomy and the 
                                                 
32 Fr. 288 Garofalo = Gal. Hipp. Aph. 6.50 [xviii/A 86 K.], οἱ δ’ Ἐρασιστράτειοι τὰς μήνιγγας τῶν νεύρων 
ἀρχὰς τιθέμενοι, διὰ μὲν τὴν ἑαυτῆς φύσιν ἐροῦσι τὴν παχεῖαν μήνιγγα ταῦτα ἐπιφέρειν τὰ συμπτώματα μόνην 
τρωθεῖσαν. εἰ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἐγκέφαλόν ποτε ἡ τρῶσις ἐξίκοιτο, τῷ φθάνειν ἀμφοτέρας προτιτρώσκεσθαι τὰς 
μήνιγγας, οὕτω φήσουσι τὴν τῶν εἰρημένων γένεσιν ἀκολουθεῖν παθημάτων. Ἐρασιστρατείους δ’ ἔφην ἐρεῖν 
ταῦτα καὶ οὐκ αὐτὸν Ἐρασίστρατον, ὅτι πρεσβύτης ὢν ἤδη καθ’ ὃν χρόνον αὐτοί φασι τὰ τῶν Διαιρέσεων αὐτῷ 
γεγράφθαι βιβλία, τὸν ἐγκέφαλον ἀπεφήνατο τῶν νεύρων ἀρχὴν ὑπάρχειν. λέλεκται δὲ περὶ τούτων ἐπὶ πλέον ἐν 
τοῖς Περὶ τῆς Ἱπποκράτους ἀνατομῆς ὑπομνήμασιν. 
three On Erasistratus’ Anatomy in this rather combative vein’.33 So Galen’s strategy will 
have been to accuse Martialis of being ignorant not only of the anatomical truth, but also of 
the fact that the founder of his own school had himself at the end of his life come to realise 
this truth. We are forced to wonder, then, why Martialis and other Erasistrateans did not 
adopt Erasistratus’ mature view concerning the source of the nerves, which Galen claims he 
set out clearly in his late work On Divisions. Why is Galen the only figure who recognises 
that Erasistratus changed his mind? It seems difficult to answer this question without further 
evidence. On the one hand, the meninges clearly played a key role according to many 
sources, including Galen. When Erasistratus stated in the above quotation that ‘the 
outgrowths of the nerves were all from the brain; and speaking generally (καθ’ ὅλον εἰπεῖν) 
the brain appears to be the source (ἀρχή) of the nerves in the body’, it is perhaps possible that 
he meant loosely the brain as including its meninges, rather than the brain as opposed to the 
meninges, as Galen took it.34 On the other hand, the passage clearly appears to substantiate 
Galen’s interpretation, and the Erasistrateans could have preferred to prioritise a theory which 
privileged the meninges over the brain, a theory which may have been more closely 
integrated with the rest of Erasistratus’ doctrine of the triplokia.  
 The passage also correlates the superior ability in rational thought (διανοεῖσθαι) of 
humans with the greater size of the brain and its greater number of convolutions: just as fast-
running animals are well provided with parts (sinews and muscles) that are useful for this 
activity, so apparently the size of the human brain and its convolutions can contribute to its 
superior ability to think. This might be taken to suggest that thinking actually takes place in 
the brain’s convolutions, but only if one believed that thinking must take place in a physical 
organ. Aristotle, for example, correlates watery blood with a keener intellect (dianoia), and 
this is explained in part by their improved perception.35 However, this was certainly not 
meant as evidence that thinking occurs in the blood. Similarly, Erasistratus’ thought might 
have been that the greater number of convolutions makes the overlying meninges more 
convoluted and the pattern of arteries and nerves more complex, which could have 
consequences for the refinement of pneuma as it passes from the arterial terminations into the 
nerves, and hence for the transmission of perceptions.36 In any case, Erasistratus shows no 
                                                 
33 Libr. Prop. 1.9-10 [19.14 K. = p. 138 Boudon-Millot]. On Martialis, and his identification with the doctor 
named Martianus in the MSS of Galen’s On Prognosis, see Boudon-Millot 2007: 185-6. 
34 It may be noted that Erasistratus observes that the meninges also extend within the body of the brain. Thus the 
cerebrum and cerebellum, and apparently each of the ventricles, ‘had been partitioned off by the meninges’. 
This should refer at least to the tentorium cerebelli, the fold of the dura mater which separates the cerebellum 
from the cerebrum, but perhaps also the falx cerebri, the fold separating the two cerebral hemispheres. So 
Erasistratus recognised that the meninges did not only cover the exterior of the brain tissue, but also penetrate 
deep into its structure. Nor does Erasistratus show signs here of wishing to be precise about where the nerves 
originate at all. The brain, after all, is a large organ, and the passage has just carefully distinguished between 
different parts of its structure. There is also a good chance that Erasistratus had in the back of his mind 
Aristotle’s claim, at HA 3.5, 515a 27-28, that the heart is the source of the body’s neura, and was here rejecting 
it: the neura are to be traced, not to the heart, but to the brain, specifically to their membranes. 
35 PA 2.4, 650b 19-23, συμβαίνει δ’ ἔνιά γε καὶ γλαφυρωτέραν ἔχειν τὴν διάνοιαν τῶν τοιούτων, οὐ διὰ τὴν 
ψυχρότητα τοῦ αἵματος, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν λεπτότητα μᾶλλον καὶ διὰ τὸ καθαρὸν εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ γεῶδες οὐδέτερον 
ἔχει τούτων. εὐκινητοτέραν γὰρ ἔχουσι τὴν αἴσθησιν τὰ λεπτοτέραν ἔχοντα τὴν ὑγρότητα καὶ καθαρωτέραν 
(‘Some at any rate of the animals with watery blood have a keener intellect. This is due not to the coldness of 
their blood, but rather to its thinness and purity; neither of which qualities belongs to the earthy matter. For the 
thinner and purer its fluid is, the more easily affected is an animal’s sensibility’, trans. Ogle). Also PA 2.2, 648a 
2-4, ἔστι δ’ ἰσχύος μὲν ποιητικώτερον τὸ παχύτερον αἷμα καὶ θερμότερον, αἰσθητικώτερον δὲ καὶ νοερώτερον 
τὸ λεπτότερον καὶ ψυχρότερον (‘The thicker and the hotter blood is, the more conducive is it to strength, while 
in proportion to its thinness and its coldness is its suitability of for sensation and intelligence’, trans. Ogle). 
36 Most, if not all, processes in Erasistratus’ account of the body’s functioning appeal to the dynamics of certain 
kinds of fluids, blood, pneuma, and so on, travelling through distinct conduits. Although Erasistratus’ term 
intention to develop his suggestion in the quotation: he has observed a peculiar feature of the 
human brain, and, given his broader teleological commitments,37 this demands an explanation 
of its purpose if possible. But he does not offer a physiology of thinking.  
 However Erasistratus worked out these details, there are general parallels here with 
Herophilus’ approach: for Erasistratus too, the body’s principal capacities were carried out by 
complex and integrated processes that converged upon, but were by no means restricted to, 
the heart and the area of the brain. Erasistratus reduced physiological function to three main 
systems, two originating in the heart, and one in the brain’s membranes, or perhaps, in a 
modified version, in the brain itself. This coheres well with Galen’s report that Erasistratus 
‘clearly stated in his On Fevers that there is not only a vital capacity in the heart, but also a 
psychic one’.38 Common to Herophilus and Erasistratus too is the view that all of these 
different functions are performed by different fluid substances: blood within the venous 
system, and pneuma, which was derived from respiration, but found at different levels of 
elaboration throughout the arterial and nervous systems. There is no sense of a hierarchy of 
systems here, or of the privileging of particular organs; if anything, it is the vessels that are 
functionally most significant, but the emphasis generally seems to be on the balanced and 
integrated working of all systems simultaneously throughout the body.  
 
Herophilus and Erasistratus on the soul? 
 A more fundamental question that arises is just how far Herophilus and Erasistratus 
were interested in questions concerning the nature of the soul and its interaction with the 
body at all. Some have argued that both Herophilus and Erasistratus had developed views on 
the soul’s corporeality, and believed that its substance was pneuma.39 The evidence, however, 
does not seem to bear this out. For Herophilus, the only potentially relevant testimonium was 
found in a Latin translation of an Arabic translation of Galen’s work On my Own Opinions, 
but the original Greek text resurfaced in 2005, and shows that it was in fact Empedocles who 
was referred to, not Herophilus (nor is Empedocles attributed a view on the pneumatic nature 
of the soul).40 Similarly, there is no evidence that Erasistratus actually identified the psychic 
pneuma which flows through the nerves with the soul itself, nor indeed that he made any 
claims at all about the substance of the soul per se. Galen is our main source for Erasistratus’ 
theory of psychic pneuma, and he never suggests that Erasistratus actually identified it with 
the soul.41 Galen himself adopts the concept of psychic pneuma in his own system, which 
was directly influenced in various ways by Erasistratus’, but he repeatedly clarifies that his 
use of the concept carries no implications about the soul’s substance, of which he declares 
                                                 
eligmoi can refer to hollow convolutions (e.g. of labyrinths or intestines), in the case of the solid brain matter the 
image should be more in line with the plies of a knotted rope, for example. 
37 For Erasistratus’ teleology, and its relation to Aristotle’s, see von Staden 1997 and Cambiano 2000. 
38 Fr. 205 Garofalo = Gal. Diff. Puls. 4.17 [viii 760 K.]. 
39 E.g. von Staden 2000: 87, ‘[Herophilus] shares [Epicurus’ and the Stoics’] belief that the material substance 
of the psychē is, in some respects, different from that of the body; and, like the Stoics, he claims that the 
substance of the soul is pneuma’; and 95, ‘[according to Erasistratus,] the arterial system carries some of the 
vital pneuma to the brain ..., where it becomes still more highly refined, namely into soul-pneuma, which is the 
soul’. 
40 T145b von Staden = Gal. Prop. Plac. 7.4 [CMG V 3, 2 p. 80 Nutton]: see now the text edited in Boudon-
Millot and Pietrobelli 2005, at p. 179.23, based on the recently discovered manuscript Vlatadon 14.  
41 Galen’s attribution to Erasistratus of the phrase πνεῦμα ψυχικόν is corroborated once in the treatise De Morbis 
Acutis et Chronicis by the so-called Anonymus Parisinus, though it is there also attributed, certainly 
anachronistically, to Hippocrates (fr. 174 Garofalo = Morb. Ac. et Chron. 4.1.2 [p. 26.7 Garofalo]). 
himself ignorant.42 In fact, we have testimonia attributing to Erasistratus the view that 
pneuma is just a tool (σύνεργον) of the body’s natural faculties.43 There is no sign that either 
Herophilus or Erasistratus put forward, or even assumed, a fully-fledged theory of the soul. In 
their theories, as far as we can tell, pneuma was merely the physical substance by which 
certain bodily functions were mediated, not only sensation and voluntary motion, but also, for 
example, the digestion of food. 
 More general considerations concerning their conception of the medical art point in 
the same direction. Both doctors were concerned to define carefully the proper domain of 
medicine in relation to natural philosophy. For them, one of the things that belonged to 
natural philosophy, but not to medicine, was the inquiry into the elements: according to both 
Herophilus and Erasistratus, doctors need only study the human body from the level of the 
uniform parts up, and do not have to know about its constitution at the elemental level; that, 
rather, is for philosophers to be concerned with. There was an apparently well known dictum 
attributed to Herophilus which was intended to describe this distinction, quoted 
independently by both Galen and the Anonymus Londinensis papyrus: he is said to have 
made the stipulation: ‘Let the apparent things be called primary, even if they are not 
primary.’ Here both Galen and the Anonymus understand the apparent things as the uniform 
parts of the body, being the most fundamental perceptible parts; the elements, even though 
more primary by nature, do not fall within the purview of medicine.44 The Anonymus openly 
aligns himself with Herophilus over this restriction, and prefaces it with another one, which 
rules out the study of the soul for doctors: ‘the human being is composed of soul and body ... 
Regarding the soul, I defer to others, but we must be concerned with the body, since medicine 
is especially focused on this’.45 This restriction on the soul is not attributed explicitly to 
Herophilus, or to Erasistratus, but the run of the passage suggests that it would have been 
fully consistent with their more stringent restrictions regarding the study of the elements. So 
it is doubtful whether a theory of the soul would have been of any interest to their narrowly 
defined medical aims.46 I suggest that the inquiry into the soul and its functioning is likely to 
have been another topic which the Alexandrians doctors left to the philosophers. This is not 
to say that Herophilus and Erasistratus are likely to have been unfavourable in principle to the 
study of the soul; rather, from their point of view as doctors, it was irrelevant to the aims of 
the medical art. 
 Herophilus and Erasistratus, then, will have been interested only in basic bodily 
functions – functions such as nutrition and digestion, motion, and sensation, which are clearly 
                                                 
42 E.g. Gal. PHP 7.3.30 [5.609 K. = CMG V 4, 1, 2 p. 446 de Lacy], ... ἐδιδάχθημεν, ὅτι τε τὸ ψυχικὸν πνεῦμα 
μήτ’ οὐσία ψυχῆς ἐστι μήτε οἶκος αὐτῆς, ἀλλ’ ὄργανον πρῶτον (‘we learned that the psychic pneuma is neither 
the substance of the soul, nor its home, but its first instrument’); Ut. Resp. 5.1 [4.501 K. = p. 120 Furley and 
Wilkie], εἴπωμεν δὲ πρότερον, πῶς καλοῦμεν τι ψυχικὸν πνεῦμα, ἀγνοεῖν ὁμολογοῦντες οὐσίαν ψυχῆς (‘Let us 
state first the way in which we call a thing “psychic pneuma”, since we concede that we are ignorant about the 
substance of the soul’); also Prop. Plac. 7 [CMG V 3, 2 p. 80 Nutton = p. 179 Boudon-Millot and Pietrobelli]. 
43 Fr. 86 Garofalo = ps.-Gal. Int. 9.3 [14.697 K. = p. 21 Petit]), δυσὶ γὰρ ὕλαις ταῦτα διοικεῖσθαι λέγει τὸ ζῷον, 
τῷ μὲν αἵματι ὡς τροφῇ, τῷ δὲ πνεύματι ὡς συνεργῷ εἰς τὰς φυσικὰς ἐνεργείας (‘For he says that these (i.e. 
fluids and pneumas) regulate the animal with two materials: blood as nourishment, and pneuma as a synergon 
for the natural activities’). 
44 For full discussion of Herophilus and Erasistratus’ methodological pronouncements regarding the study of the 
elements, see Leith 2015b.  
45 Anon. Lond. xxi 13-18 [p. 45 Manetti], [σ]υνέστη[κεν δὲ] ὁ ἄνθρωπος | ἐκ ̣[ψυ]χῆ[ς] καὶ σώμ[α]τ̣[ο]ς̣ ... . [καὶ 
πε]ρ̣ὶ μ(ὲν) ψυχῆς | [ἄλλοι]ς̣ ἀν[̣α]βάλλομα[ι, ἡμῖν δὲ] τοῦ σώμα|[τος μ]ελη̣τέον ἐπεὶ [μάλιστα] περὶ τοῦτο 
[σπου]δ̣ά̣ζ̣ει ἡ ἰατρικ[ή. 
46 This is not to suggest that ancient doctors in general were uninterested in the soul per se: later physicians, 
such as Asclepiades of Bithynia and Galen, were of course directly interested in such matters. But these doctors 
also believed, significantly, that the inquiry into the elements was a necessary part of medicine.  
associated with (often newly identified) bodily structures,47 and are mediated by the bodily 
fluids, especially blood and pneuma. It is precisely these functions which, firstly, need to be 
understood in order to preserve human health and prevent disease, and which, secondly, are 
within the doctor’s power to influence using medical treatments. From this perspective, both 
the brain and the heart play different but similarly fundamental roles. But there is no sign that 
this physiological analysis was meant to be applied to any more fundamental psychology: 
there is no inquiry into the soul’s materiality implied here, or its structure, or the question of 
how it interacts with the body.  
 Within this general context, it seems to me to make little sense to describe Herophilus 
and Erasistratus’ theories in terms of locating a hēgemonikon in a single part of the body. 
They show no sign of having assumed a unified, corporeal soul. Nor is there the idea of a 
central ruling part in control of all other basic functions, nor of a single substance mediating 
these functions simultaneously. Their analysis is simply not comparable to the Stoic theory.  
 Yet the discovery of the nervous system was evidently of interest to the Stoics in this 
connection, Chrysippus in particular. In the next section, I shall look at the evidence for 
Chrysippus’ engagement with Herophilus and Erasistratus, and speculate on how his 
discussion might have influenced subsequent accounts of their views.  
 
Chrysippus on the nervous system 
 Our knowledge of Chrysippus’ response comes from Galen’s treatise On the Opinions 
of Hippocrates and Plato, which contains extensive verbatim quotations from the Stoic’s 
treatise On the Soul. Chrysippus began his inquiry into the location of the hēgemonikon in the 
second part of On the Soul book 1, as Galen specifies. Here he observed that various 
predecessors had proposed locations for the hēgemonikon, and among them were both 
doctors and philosophers. Some of these had proposed different locations within the head, 
and it is highly likely that Herophilus and Erasistratus will have been among the doctors 
Chrysippus had in mind. Galen gives the following verbatim quotation from Chrysippus’ On 
the Soul book 1:48 
But about the governing part of the soul there is disagreement, some placing it in one 
region, others in another. For some say it is located in the chest, others in the head. 
And there are differences even within these locations, as they do not agree among 
themselves where in the head or chest it is located. Plato, who said that the soul has 
three parts, placed the rational part in the head, the spirited in the region of the chest, 
and the desiderative in the region of the navel. Thus the place seems to elude us, since 
we have neither a clear perception (of it), as we had with the others, nor sure signs 
from which this matter might be inferred; otherwise disagreement among physicians 
and philosophers would not have grown so great. 
                                                 
47 Note that the arteries were first distinguished from the veins by Herophilus’ teacher Praxagoras. 
48 PHP 3.1.12-15 [p. 170 de Lacy], trans. de Lacy, περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς διαφωνοῦσιν 
ἄλλοι ἐν ἄλλοις λέγοντες αὐτὸ εἶναι τόποις. οἱ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὸν θώρακά φασιν εἶναι αὐτό, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν 
κεφαλήν. κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα διαφωνοῦσι, ποῦ τῆς κεφαλῆς καὶ τοῦ θώρακός ἐστιν, οὐ συμφωνοῦντες 
αὐτοῖς. Πλάτων δὲ καὶ τριμερῆ τὴν ψυχὴν φήσας εἶναι τὸ μὲν λογιστικὸν ἔλεγεν ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ εἶναι, τὸ δὲ 
θυμοειδὲς περὶ τὸν θώρακα, τὸ δὲ ἐπιθυμητικὸν περὶ τὸν ὀμφαλόν. οὕτω φαίνεται διαφεύγειν ὁ τόπος ἡμᾶς οὔτ’ 
αἰσθήσεως ἐκφανοῦς γενομένης, ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν συντετύχηκεν, οὔτε τῶν τεκμηρίων δι’ ὧν ἄν τις 
συλλογίσαιτο τοῦτο· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἀντιλογία ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον προῆλθεν καὶ ἐν ἰατροῖς καὶ ἐν φιλοσόφοις. 
In the course of Chrysippus’ subsequent discussion, the nervous system and its origin then 
came up, as Galen tells us on several occasions,49 specifically in the context of the Stoic 
speech argument. Galen reports Chrysippus’ version of the speech argument as follows: ‘It is 
reasonable that that to which the meanings in this go and out from which discourse (λόγος) 
comes is the sovereign part of the soul. For it is not true that the source of discourse (λόγος) 
is other than the source of thought (διάνοια), or, to state the whole matter simply, that the 
source of speech is other than the sovereign part of the soul’.50 Chrysippus evidently saw the 
function of the nervous system as a potential threat to his cardiocentrism, which needed to be 
countered: the fact that the nerves issue from the brain and mediate voluntary motion might 
be taken to conflict with his view that speech, and conation in general, arise in the 
hēgemonikon in the heart. Galen offers a single excerpt51 from Chrysippus’ broader response 
to this potential problem:52 
 “But as I said, it is more important for them on all counts if perhaps this too should be 
 granted, that according as they travel about, the source is from the head to the parts 
 mentioned. Let us examine (the matter) further. Surely the same sort of statement that 
 they might make about speech, that it is carried out of the chest through the windpipe 
 with an initiation of some kind coming from the head, can be made if the governing 
 part is in the heart but the beginning of the movements is from the head.” What 
 Chrysippus means in this passage is this: even if a person should concede that the 
 head is the source of nerves, he will not necessarily concede that the governing part is 
 also in the head. For the kind of statements that those others can make about speech 
 being carried out of the chest through the windpipe while the head sends the 
 beginning of action to the parts, may be made to us about the nerves, that they start 
 from the head but receive their activity from the heart. 
At this point in his argument, Chrysippus appears to have accepted, at least provisionally, the 
premise that the source of voluntary motion may be in the head.53 But he argues that, even if 
                                                 
49 See PHP 3.5.35 [p. 208 de Lacy], ἑξῆς δὲ περί τε φωνῆς μνημονεύει καὶ νεύρων ἀρχῆς, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἀμφοτέρων 
εἴρηταί μοι κατὰ τὰ πρόσθεν ὑπομνήματα (‘Next he takes up speech and the source of the nerves, both of which 
I discussed in the preceding books’); PHP 3.7.55 [p. 222 de Lacy], μετὰ δὴ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐπῶν ἐφεξῆς ὁ 
Χρύσιππος περί τε φωνῆς καὶ λόγου καὶ νεύρων ἀρχῆς ὅσα τε τούτοις συνέζευκται διῆλθεν, ἃ δὴ καὶ μόνα τῶν 
κατὰ τὸ βιβλίον ἔπρεπεν ἀνδρὶ φιλοσόφῳ (‘After the spate of hexameters, Chrysippus next took up the source of 
speech, discourse and nerves, and matters related thereto. These are the only things in his book that befit a 
philosopher’). 
50 PHP 2.5.15-16 [p. 130 de Lacy]. Galen also records Zeno’s and Diogenes of Babylon’s versions of the 
argument at PHP 2.5.7-13 [pp. 128-30 de Lacy]. 
51 Note e.g. in the following quotation that there is no plausible antecedent in the surviving fragments for 
Chrysippus’ reference to a previous discussion (‘As I said, …’). Similarly, who ‘they’ are in the passage quoted 
is never explicitly stated, though of course Galen implies that it is Herophilus and Erasistratus; perhaps these 
figures were indeed named by Chrysippus in the earlier discussion to which he has just referred. Again, the 
passage in which he cites Praxagoras’ views on neura (see below) is not quoted by Galen. 
52 PHP 2.5.69-70 [p. 140 De Lacy], “ἔχει δ’ ὡς ἔφην πλείονα αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ πᾶσι, μή ποτ’ εἰ καὶ τοῦτο δοθείη, 
καθάπερ ἐπιπορεύονται, ἀπὸ τῆς κεφαλῆς εἶναι τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐπὶ τὰ εἰρημένα μέρη. ἐπιζητήσωμεν· σχεδὸν γάρ, οἷα 
ἄν τινα λέγοιεν περὶ τοῦ τὴν φωνὴν ἐκ τοῦ στήθους φέρεσθαι διὰ τῆς φάρυγγος, ἀπὸ τῆς κεφαλῆς ποιᾶς τινος 
καταρχῆς γιγνομένης, τοιαῦτ’ ἔξεστι λέγειν, ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ μὲν τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ὄντος, τῆς δὲ τῶν κινήσεων ἀρχῆς 
ἀπὸ τῆς κεφαλῆς οὔσης.” ὃ γὰρ δὴ βούλεται λέγειν ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇδε τῇ ῥήσει, τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν· εἰ καὶ 
συγχωρήσειέ τις ἀρχὴν εἶναι νεύρων τὴν κεφαλήν, οὐ πάντως ἐν αὐτῇ συγχωρήσει καὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ὑπάρχειν. 
ἃ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι δύνανται λέγειν ὑπὲρ τοῦ τὴν φωνὴν ἐκ τοῦ στήθους διὰ τῆς φάρυγγος ἐκφέρεσθαι τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς 
ἐνεργείας τοῖς μορίοις ἐπιπεμπούσης τῆς κεφαλῆς, τοιαῦτ’ ἔξεστι λέγειν ὑπὲρ τῶν νεύρων ἡμῖν, ὡς ἐκ μὲν τῆς 
κεφαλῆς ἀρχομένων, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς καρδίας τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἐχόντων. 
53 For discussion, see Tieleman 1996: 51-2. Chrysippus does not mention voluntary motion or the nerves 
specifically in the quotation, but Galen notes elsewhere that he discussed ‘speech and the source of nerves’ in 
it were, this need not threaten his cardiocentrism. Speech, he takes it, unquestionably arises 
from the chest. So on the account of those who believe that motions are initiated in the head, 
there must be some subordinate centre in the chest from which the motions involved in 
speech arise. But once this notion of a subordinate centre is introduced, there seems no reason 
why it should not also complicate his opponents’ model. Identifying the source of the nerves, 
he argued, cannot straightforwardly tell us where the hēgemonikon is. So in this context 
Chrysippus was not calling the anatomists’ findings into question; rather he wanted to show 
that the functioning of the motor nerves issuing from the brain would be compatible with his 
cardiocentrism.  
 Elsewhere, however, Galen tells us that Chrysippus adduced the account of 
Herophilus’ teacher Praxagoras of Cos54 against the Herophilean/Erasistratean view:55 
 But since I have this once become engaged in examining all views, I wish to argue 
 briefly with Praxagoras, especially because Chrysippus too mentioned the man,
 opposing him to those who hold that the nerves take their beginning from the head.  
It is plausible, as Teun Tieleman has argued, that Chrysippus’ engagement with such 
scientific views was dialectical in nature: he need not have accepted Praxagoras’ views as 
true, but merely wished to emphasise the disagreement among experts (though Tieleman is 
also happy to accept that Chrysippus actively took on various aspects of Praxagoras’ 
physiology in other contexts).56 Chrysippus himself, it may be noted, disavowed any detailed 
knowledge of human anatomy:57 
 You might nevertheless put up with Chrysippus, who modestly declared that his heart 
 did not vouchsafe to him either the knowledge that it is the source of the nerves, or 
 any other answer to the questions that arise in connection with this problem; for he 
 admits that he is ignorant of anatomy. 
He thus conceded the authority of the doctors on technical issues, and so he needed such an 
authority, in this case Praxagoras, to counterbalance Herophilus’ discovery of the nervous 
                                                 
the same context (see n. 49 above), and it seems very likely that this argument was directed at those who located 
the origin of the nervous system in the head, as Galen claims. 
54 For Praxagoras, Steckerl 1958 should be used with some caution; see now Lewis 2017 for Praxagoras’ 
physiology.  
55 PHP 1.7.1 [p. 82 de Lacy], ἐγὼ δὲ ἐπειδήπερ ἅπαξ κατέστην εἰς τὸ περὶ πάντων διασκέψασθαι, βραχέα τῷ 
Πραξαγόρᾳ διαλεχθῆναι βούλομαι καὶ μάλισθ’ ὅτι καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐμνημόνευε τἀνδρος ἀντιθεὶς τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς 
κεφαλῆς ἄρχεσθαι τὰ νεῦρα νομίζουσιν. 
56 For Chrysippus’ engagement with scientific material, see Tieleman 1996: 189-95; for his use of Praxagoras, 
Tieleman 1996: 83-5. 
57 PHP 1.6.13-14 [p. 80 de Lacy], καίτοι Χρύσιππον μὲν ἄν τις ἀποδέξαιτο μετρίως ἀποφηνάμενον ὡς μήθ’ ὅτι 
τῶν νεύρων ἀρχὴ ἡ καρδία τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτῷ χαρίζεται μήτ’ ἄλλο μηδὲν τῶν κατὰ τὸ πρόβλημα τοῦτο 
ζητουμένων· ὁμολογεῖ γὰρ ἀπείρως ἔχειν τῶν ἀνατομῶν. 
system.58 Galen describes Praxagoras’ anatomy of neura, which presumably constituted at 
least part of what Chrysippus opposed to those who hold that the nerves begin in the head:59 
 [Praxagoras] ventured on no inconsiderable fiction: he said that as the arteries 
 advance and divide they become constricted and change into neura; for since their 
 body is neuron-like but hollow, and the hollows get so small with the progressive 
 divisions in the animal that the tunics (of the artery) come together, as soon as this 
 happens, the vessel then appears as a neuron. 
Galen portrays this as a fantastical account of the origins of the nerves, that is, of the nervous 
system as we would recognise it. But this is clearly not what Praxagoras had in mind: his 
remarks concerning the arteries becoming neura need amount only to the Aristotelian 
observation that at their extremities blood vessels become like neura in that their cavity 
disappears.60 This is what Aristotle has to say in History of Animals:61  
 The neura of animals are arranged as follows. The starting-point of them, as of blood-
 vessels, is the heart: the heart has neura within itself, in the largest cavity; and the 
 aorta as it is called is a neuron-like blood vessel; indeed, its extremities are wholly 
 neuron-like, for they are not hollow, and it can be stretched in the same way as the 
 neura where they terminate at the joints of the bones. Nevertheless, the neura do not 
 constitute a continuous system from one starting-point, as the blood vessels do. 
Both Praxagoras and Aristotle seem to think of the arteries and the neura as similarly elastic 
structures; what distinguishes them is the fact that arteries are hollow, while neura are solid.62 
But the arteries get narrower as they ramify, until their coats finally come into contact and 
become solid and uniform, at which point this distinction disappears and they become 
basically neura themselves.  
 Praxagoras, then, was not talking about nerves, but about neura, that is, about generic 
cord-like structures in the body that might include tendons and ligaments. Hence his 
observation about the connection between neura and arteries does not in fact conflict with 
Herophilus and Erasistratus’ location of the origin of the nerves in the brain, though 
                                                 
58 Cf. Plut. Stoic. Rep. 1047C, ‘In the Physical Propositions, (Chrysippus) has exorted us to be quiet about 
matters requiring scientific experience and research if we have not something of greater force and clarity to say, 
“in order,” he says, “not to make surmises either like Plato’s that the liquid nourishment goes to the lungs and 
the dry to the belly or other errors like this”’. Plato was criticised on the former point by Aristotle (PA 3.3, 664b 
2-35) and Erasistratus (Plut. Quaest. Conv. 697F ff.), who both pointed to the function of the epiglottis. 
Praxagoras similarly described the epiglottis, though we do not know whether he linked this to an explicit 
criticism of Plato (fr. 10 Steckerl). See further Tieleman 1996: 191-4. 
59 PHP 1.6.18 [p. 82 de Lacy], οὐ σμικρὸν ἀπετόλμησε ψεύσασθαι τὰς ἀρτηρίας φάμενος ἐν τῷ προϊέναι καὶ 
κατασχίζεσθαι στενὰς γιγνομένας εἰς νεῦρα μεταβάλλειν· τοῦ γὰρ δὴ σώματος αὐτῶν ὑπάρχοντος νευρώδους 
μὲν ἀλλὰ κοίλου, <καὶ> κατὰ τὴν ἐπὶ πλέον ἐν τῷ ζῴῳ σχίσιν οὕτως γιγνομένων μικρῶν τῶν κοιλοτήτων ὡς 
ἐπιπίπτειν ἀλλήλοις τοὺς χιτῶνας, ὁπόταν τοῦτο πρῶτον γένηται, νεῦρον ἤδη φαίνεσθαι τὸ ἀγγεῖον. 
60 For full discussion of this point, see Lewis 2017: 235-6, 280-3. 
61 HA 3.5, 515a 29-32 (after Peck), τὰ δὲ νεῦρα τοῖς ζῴοις ἔχει τόνδε τὸν τρόπον. ἡ μὲν ἀρχὴ καὶ τούτων ἐστὶν 
ἀπὸ τῆς καρδίας· καὶ γὰρ ἐν αὑτῇ ἡ καρδία ἔχει νεῦρα ἐν τῇ μεγίστῃ κοιλίᾳ, καὶ ἡ καλουμένη ἀορτὴ νευρώδης 
ἐστι φλέψ, τὰ μέντοι τελευταῖα καὶ παντελῶς αὐτῆς· ἄκοιλα γάρ ἐστι, καὶ τάσιν ἔχει τοιαύτην οἵαν περ τὰ 
νεῦρα, ᾗ τελευτᾷ πρὸς τὰς καμπὰς τῶν ὀστῶν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔστι συνεχὴς ἡ τῶν νεύρων φύσις ἀπὸ μιᾶς 
ἀρχῆς, ὥσπερ αἱ φλέβες. 
62 Cf. also HA 3.3, 513b 7-11, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ μὲν μεγάλη φλὲψ ὑμενώδης καὶ δερματώδης, ἡ δ’ ἀορτὴ στενοτέρα 
μὲν ταύτης, σφόδρα δὲ νευρώδης καὶ ἀποτεινομένη πόρρω πρός τε τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ πρὸς τὰ κάτω μόρια στενή 
τε γίνεται καὶ νευρώδης πάμπαν (‘The Great Blood-vessel is membranous and skinlike in appearance, whereas 
the Aorta is narrower, and very neuron-like; and as it continues on farther towards the head and the lower parts 
of the body it becomes narrow and entirely neuron-like’, after Peck). 
Chrysippus evidently wanted his audience to believe it did. Neither Praxagoras nor Aristotle 
had a conception of the nervous system per se – that was born only with Herophilus’ 
identification of the nerves as a distinct structure issuing from the brain and spinal cord, and 
with his recognition of their function in mediating sensation and voluntary motion. Insofar as 
Praxagoras’ anatomy linked the neura with the heart, it did so only by emphasising the 
importance of the arterial system. There is no question here of the neura themselves 
originating in the heart. But Chrysippus, writing in the latter part of the third century BC, 
knew Herophilean/Erasistratean descriptions of the neura as a unified and continuous 
network issuing from a single organ. This was quite different from the disunited and non-
continuous conception of neura that Aristotle and Praxagoras held. So Chrysippus knew two 
distinct types of description of neura. An obvious difference between these was that the 
Herophilean/Erasistratean version located the origin of the neura in the area of the brain, 
while the Praxagorean/Aristotelian version seemed to link them (albeit indirectly) with the 
heart. Therefore, a selective conflation of the two could yield, at least prima facie, a 
medically respectable description of the nervous system originating in the heart. 
 Evidence that just this conflation later became an established part of Stoic doctrine 
may be found in Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods, where the Stoic spokesman Balbus 
offers human physiology as an argument for divine providence. In the course of his 
description, he refers to the structure of the neura: ‘Add to this the nervi, by which the limbs 
are held together, and their network which stretches out through the entire body; just like the 
veins and arteries which proceed continuously from the heart as their starting-point, they pass 
to all parts of the body’.63 This Stoic physiology,64 I believe, can best be made sense of as 
appealing to a fundamentally Herophilean conception of the nervous system, but one which 
has been anachronistically superimposed on a Praxagorean view regarding the arteries and 
neura. Here we have the idea that neura form a unitary network ramifying throughout the 
body, one which represents, together with the arteries and veins, the third major such network 
in human physiology. This is undoubtedly post-Herophilean. As we have seen, Praxagoras’ 
neura were not ‘nerves’, but rather the solid, ‘cord-like’ extremities of the arterial system, 
and they did not form a unified network spanning the entire body. On the other hand, 
although Balbus does not directly compare the nerves to the veins and arteries with regard to 
the latter’s origin in the heart,65 one could nevertheless receive that impression from the 
report,66 and there is certainly no mention of the brain or head. This physiology appears to 
run together a basically Herophilean/Erasistratean conception of a unified nervous system 
with a more Praxagorean association of the nervi with the arteries and veins arising from the 
heart. Such a conflation is very similar to the one made by Galen in his refutation of 
Praxagoras’ account in book 1 of PHP.  
 All this makes perfect sense for Chrysippus, who was fully aware of the Alexandrian 
anatomy of the nervous system, found it a potential threat to his unified, cardiocentric 
psychology, but who was also aware of Praxagoras’ anatomy. While self-confessedly 
avoiding any direct investigation into the anatomical reality, he exploited (perhaps not fully 
consciously) the ambiguity in the terminology for neura in the medical tradition, and opposed 
                                                 
63 Cic. ND 2.139 (trans. Rackham), huc adde nervos, a quibus artus continentur, eorumque inplicationem 
corpore toto pertinentem, qui sicut venae et arteriae a corde tractae et profectae in corpus omne ducuntur. 
64 For association with Chrysippus in particular, see Hahm 1977: 162-3 and 181 n. 68; Tieleman 1996: 86 n. 82. 
65 I am grateful to John Wynne for impressing this point on me at the Symposium. 
66 As many have done: cf. e.g. Walsh’s translation, ‘Like the veins and arteries, they issue from the heart, and 
they spread to every part of the body’; Hahm 1977: 181 n. 68, ‘In Cic. Nat. D. 2.139 the nervi seem to be 
ligaments, at least primarily, and in addition originate in the heart’. 
Praxagoras’ account to that of Herophilus and Erasistratus, although the two accounts did not 
in fact conflict (at least not in the way he required).67  
 For present purposes, one of the main points to emphasise is that the problem of the 
nervous system became acute for Chrysippus only because of the broader Stoic commitment 
to a unified, corporeal soul converging on a single, governing command centre. It is 
important to observe that Chrysippus devoted the first part of his On the Soul to establishing 
the substance of the soul before he came to discuss its structure.68 (Note that this progression 
mirrors the sequence of topics in Placita 4.3-5.) At this point in his argument, it was already 
confirmed that the soul is a unified material substance, with parts that are internally 
connected, and that collectively converge on a central location that regulates and governs the 
whole. So given this theoretical background, the view that the nerves are responsible for 
mediating sensation and voluntary motion, and originate in the head, obviously points to the 
head as housing this central location (though not conclusively, as Chrysippus correctly 
pointed out). But if one does not conceive of the soul as a unified material substance with a 
single, central governing location, then the anatomy and physiology of the nervous system is 
hardly likely to point to the same sort of conclusion. For Herophilus and Erasistratus, the 
nervous system showed that the brain, or its meninges, played an important role in mediating 
sensation and voluntary motion, but that was basically all. The evidence suggests that 
Herophilus and Erasistratus were only interested in explaining fundamental physiological 
processes, and that these had their sources in both the brain and the heart. They had no 
motivation to posit a single organ or structure in the body that governed all fundamental 
functions. Nor, as doctors, were they interested in explaining such basic mental phenomena 
as thinking, emotion, etc., which may have had for them no clear physical basis, nor any clear 
relevance to the goals of medicine.69 Herophilus and Erasistratus seem to have been 
interested rather in the fundamental processes connected with digestion, perception and 
voluntary motion, all of which were mediated by the physical substances of blood and 
pneuma derived from respiration. But it was not just the brain and/or its meninges that played 
a crucial role in mediating these basic processes: the heart was fundamental not only to 
digestion and nutrition, but also, for example, to natural motion, and it supplied the brain and 
its meninges with the pneuma which made its way into the nervous system. Herophilus and 
Erasistratus simply did not analyse bodily functions in terms of a corporeal soul with a 
central command centre.  
 Chrysippus, then, was forced to deal with the nervous system, not because physicians 
presented the nervous system as evidence for an encephalocentric conception of the soul’s 
functioning, but because it seemed to Chrysippus to undermine his own, peculiar brand of 
cardiocentrism, and in particular the Stoic speech argument. If there could be only a single 
organ regulating all functions associated with the soul, then he needed an account of the 
nervous system that could be integrated with his broader psychology (especially the Stoic 
argument that rational speech comes from the chest), and at the same time had some 
anatomical respectability. Because Chrysippus’ immediate concern was to establish the 
location of the hēgemonikon, he naturally addressed the issue of the nervous system only 
                                                 
67 This would also be fully consistent with Chrysippus’ claim that ‘all the organs of sense extend to this part (sc. 
the hēgemonikon in the heart)’ (quoted at PHP 3.5.31 [p. 206 de Lacy]): he could make this claim based on his 
revised anatomy of the nervous system, according to which the nerves issue from the heart.  
68 Gal. PHP 3.1.9-17 [p. 170 de Lacy]. 
69 Again, this is not to suggest that ancient doctors in general could never have any interests in such mental 
phenomena - Galen is a clear counter-example -, but, as we have seen, Herophilus and Erasistratus appear to 
have been more restrictive than most physicians about the proper domain of medicine, as evidenced in their 
views on the inquiry into elements, and they were certainly criticised by Galen on this account. 
insofar as it impinged on that particular question. Since it became a threat given Chrysippus’ 
own theory, it makes sense that he should have considered the nervous system within that 
theory’s framework. He was not interested in what Herophilus and Erasistratus thought about 
the functioning of the nervous system, but only in the (unforeseen) implications it had for his 
own analysis of the soul.  
 
The Source of the Placita reports 
 The question remains why we have the Placita testimonia attributing to Herophilus 
and Erasistratus views regarding the location of the hēgemonikon, as if they did adhere to a 
Chrysippean psychology. I suggest that a plausible source for these testimonia is Chrysippus’ 
own treatise. As we know from Galen’s quotation, Chrysippus gave a doxographical 
overview of various views of doctors and philosophers as if they too were concerned with 
identifying the location of the hēgemonikon. Some of these, he tells us, located it in different 
parts of the head. To quote again from the passage above: ‘For some say it is located in the 
chest, others in the head. And there are differences even within these locations, as they do not 
agree among themselves where in the head or chest it is located.’70 Given Chrysippus’ 
anxieties about the nervous system, he will certainly have had in mind here (perhaps among 
other views) Herophilus’ tracing of the nerves to the base of the brain, and Erasistratus’ 
tracing of them to the brain’s meninges. And it is clear from his wording here and his 
argumentation discussed earlier that he would have taken ‘location of the origin of the 
nerves’ as a proxy for ‘location of the hēgemonikon’. In defending his theory against the 
broader implications of their views, Chrysippus may well have given the impression that 
Herophilus and Erasistratus themselves were actually promoting a view which located the 
hēgemonikon in the brain or its meninges. The sort of material upon which the Placita entries 
on Herophilus and Erasistratus regarding the location of the hēgemonikon were based could 
have been available in Chrysippus’ On the Soul.  
 Of course, these correspondences could alternatively be accounted for by positing a 
common source for the Aëtian Placita and Chrysippus’ treatise. Jaap Mansfeld has argued 
that Chrysippus must have had access to a Vetustissima Placita, which was current in the 
third century, and already contained various views, including Herophilus and Erasistratus’, on 
the location of the hēgemonikon.71 That certainly cannot be ruled out. But there are perhaps 
some reasons for looking to Chrysippus’ On the Soul itself. An earlier source should likewise 
have attempted to give a peculiarly Stoic interpretation of Herophilus and Erasistratus’ views 
in the way described above. But to my knowledge there is no sign that Cleanthes or any early 
Stoic engaged with the medical tradition in any such way before Chrysippus. Mansfeld 
objected that Chrysippus’ short outline of the disagreements regarding the location of the 
hēgemonikon, which mentions Plato but no other authority by name, could not have been the 
source.72 But Chrysippus had dealt with those who located the origin of the nerves in the head 
in another part of his text in more detail.73 We have every reason to believe that Chrysippus’ 
                                                 
70 PHP 3.1.12-13 [p. 170 de Lacy]. 
71 Mansfeld 1989: 334-8, and 1990: 3167-77. 
72 Mansfeld 1989: 337 n. 97, ‘I am not prepared to consider the possibility that Chrysippus’ remark about the 
disagreement inspired the author(s) of the Plac. to compose the chapter on the hegemonikon; it is far too 
succinct to attract this kind of attention’. 
73 We know that he discussed the view that the nerves originate in the head, and that he referred to the 
upholders of this view in a passage which does not now survive (see above n. 51). He might even have staged a 
dialectical opposition between Herophilus and Erasistratus on this point, i.e. regarding their privileging of the 
introductory outline of the disagreement was not the only place in which he discussed 
individual views. My suggestion is only that Chrysippus’ exposition inspired the inclusion of 
the topic of the location of the hēgemonikon, and at least some of the entries: the Placita 
chapter had obviously been altered and updated in various ways by Aëtius’ time, and 
Chrysippus’ influence on its preserved content may have been relatively limited. I also doubt 
that it follows from the way in which Chrysippus introduces the disagreement that he must 
have expected his audience to be familiar with a specific text which listed the separate views 
with the name labels.74 As Mansfeld also observed, on the other hand, the entries at Placita 
4.2-5 proceed from the definition of the soul to the issue of its corporeality, then the number 
of its parts, and finally to the location of the hēgemonikon, in precisely the same sequence as 
in Chrysippus’ On the Soul. Of course, this could just as well represent Chrysippus’ direct 
influence on the Placita tradition as the other way around. 
 
Strato of Lampsacus 
 If this is accepted, it might also help to account for what I regard as another 
peculiarity, namely the view that the Placita attributes to Strato of Lampsacus on the location 
of the hēgemonikon, immediately before the entries on Erasistratus and Herophilus (see 
introduction). We are told that Strato placed it in the ‘mid-brow’ (μεσόφρυον), the space 
between the eyebrows.75 It is hard to see, however, what on earth could have made Strato 
wish to focus on this particular spot: there is nothing as far as I can tell in the medical or 
philosophical traditions which would recommend it as having any particular psychic 
importance.76 There is another testimonium for Strato which mentions both the space 
between the eyebrows and the hēgemonikon close together, but there is no sign that this space 
holds any unique significance:77 
                                                 
cerebellum or the meninges, as a way of undermining their authority, at the same time as he opposed 
Praxagoras’ view to theirs. 
74 As Mansfeld 1989: 334, suggests. 
75 Sylvia Berryman discusses Strato’s psychology in detail elsewhere in this volume, though she has different 
views on his relation to the medical tradition from mine. On the hēgemonikon, the relevant Stratonic testimonia 
are frr. 57-8 Sharples = frr. 119-121 Wehrli (ps.-Plut. Plac. 4.5; Tert. DA 15.4-5). See also fr. 66 Sharples = fr. 
128 Wehrli (ps.-Plut. Plac. 5.24), which likewise mentions the space between the eyebrows as the location of 
the hēgemonikon, but the emendation of Plato’s name to that of Strato is a modern conjecture, and the account 
of sleep it gives differs from that explicitly attributed to Strato in fr. 67 = fr. 129 Wehrli (Tert. DA 43.1-2). 
76 The view is normally taken to represent a basically encephalocentric theory, placing Strato at least loosely in 
the same camp as other thinkers such as Plato and the Hellenistic doctors. Yet the plain fact is seldom 
acknowledged that the space between the eyebrows, the μεσόφρυον, is not a part of the brain; Mansfeld 1989: 
318-19 is surely quite correct to distinguish Strato’s doxa from the encephalocentric views on the hēgemonikon. 
Modrak 2011: 391-2, suggests that ‘[p]erhaps, he was influenced by such considerations as the simultaneous 
visual perception through each eye, or the apparently simultaneous perception of sound through both ears, or 
odor through both nostrils’, such that ‘Strato would be inclined to situate the hēgemonikon equidistant from each 
eye or ear or nostril’. But such speculation serves only to highlight the inappropriateness of the space between 
the eyebrows for any theory of perception: that spot is certainly equidistant from the eyebrows, but not from the 
sense-organs. 
77 Fr. 63B Sharples = fr. 111 Wehrli (Plut. (?) Lib. 4), ὡς δὲ τὴν φωνὴν τοῖς ὠσὶν αὐτοῖς ἐνηχοῦσαν ἔξω 
δοκοῦμεν εἶναι, τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐπὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν διάστημα τῇ αἰσθήσει προσλογιζόμενοι, παραπλησίως τὸν 
ἐκ τοῦ τραύματος πόνον οὐχ ὅπου τὴν αἴσθησιν εἴληφεν, ἀλλ’ ὅθεν ἔσχε τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι δοκοῦμεν, ἑλκομένης 
ἐπ’ ἐκεῖνο τῆς ψυχῆς ἀφ’ οὗ πέπονθε. διὸ καὶ προσκόψαντες αὐτίκα τὰς ὀφρῦς συνάγομεν, τῷ πληγέντι μορίῳ 
τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ τὴν αἴσθησιν ὀξέως ἀποδιδόντος, καὶ παρεγκάπτομεν ἔσθ’ ὅτε τὸ πνεῦμα, κἂν τὰ μέρη δεσμοῖς 
διαλαμβάνηται, <...> χερσὶ σφόδρα πιέζομεν, <ἐν>ιστάμενοι πρὸς τὴν διάδοσιν τοῦ πάθους καὶ τὴν πληγὴν ἐν 
τοῖς ἀναισθήτοις θλίβοντες, ἵνα μὴ <τῷ> συνάψαι πρὸς τὸ φρονοῦν ἀλγηδὼν γένηται. 
 Just as we think that the voice which sounds in our ears is outside, adding to the 
 sensation the distance from the source to the hēgemonikon, in a similar way we think 
 that the pain from the wound is not where the sensation has been received, but where 
 it had its origin, the soul being drawn to that part from where it was affected. And for 
 this reason when we bump into something we immediately draw our eyebrows 
 together (αὐτίκα τὰς ὀφρῦς συνάγομεν), when the hēgemonikon swiftly assigns 
 sensation to the part that has been struck, and we sometimes swallow our breath, and 
 if our limbs are held by bonds, <...>, we press hard with our hands, obstructing the 
 transmission of the affection and compressing the blow in the parts that are without 
 sensation, so that it should not, by reaching the intelligent part, become pain. 
In the context of this list, the physical phenomenon observed in connection with the eyebrows 
does not appear to be privileged or regarded as any more significant than those connected 
with breathing or squeezing with the hands. All of these examples appear intended to 
illustrate how, when we are struck, we instinctively try to disrupt the continuity between the 
affected part and the part of the body in which stimuli are registered and become perceptions. 
So we would expect all these phenomena to concern locations somewhere between the 
affected part and the central location. If the central part compressed itself, it would be too late 
for the stimulus to be prevented from reaching it. The possibility should be taken seriously 
that Strato was merely elaborating, and providing further support for, Aristotle’s view that 
sensation properly occurs only in the common sensorium (in the heart).78  
 Several other Stratonic testimonia on the soul show interest in the same issue. The 
Placita elsewhere records that ‘Strato [says that] the emotions of the soul too, and the 
sensations, have their being in the hēgemonikon and not in the places that are affected. For it 
is in [the soul] that they are undergone, as with fearful and painful things’.79 In his On the 
Intelligence of Animals, Plutarch argues against the Stoic denial that animals are intelligent or 
rational beings. He takes it that pursuit or avoidance of the objects of sensation requires the 
rational functions of calculating, judging, remembering and so on. If animals were irrational, 
they would be unable to pursue or avoid what they perceive, and hence, in conflict with the 
Stoic conception of providence, Nature would have given them sensation not only 
pointlessly, but also cruelly, since they would actually be better off without it in the absence 
of rationality. Having set out this argument, Plutarch next brings in Strato:80 
And indeed there is an argument of Strato the natural philosopher which shows that 
not even sensation is present at all in the absence of mind. For frequently we fail to 
notice letters when we traverse them with our sight and words that fall on our ears, 
because we have our mind on something else; and then again (the mind) returns and 
runs after and pursues and gathers up each of the things that are uttered.81 This is why 
                                                 
78 Arist. Sens. 2, 438b 9-17. See Johansen 1997: 67-95, esp. 74-94, for full discussion of Aristotle’s view 
concerning the heart as locus of perception. 
79 Fr. 63A Sharples = fr. 110 Wehrli (Plut. Plac. 4.23).  
80 Fr. 62 Sharples = fr. 112 Wehrli (Plut. Soll. Anim. 960E-961A), after Sharples, καίτοι Στράτωνός γε τοῦ 
φυσικοῦ λόγος ἐστὶν ἀποδεικνύων ὡς οὐδ’ αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ παράπαν ἄνευ τοῦ νοεῖν ὑπάρχει· καὶ γὰρ γράμματα 
πολλάκις ἐπιπορευομένους τῇͅ ͅͅ ὄψει καὶ λόγοι προσπίπτοντες τῇͅ ͅͅ ἀκοῇͅ ͅͅ διαλανθάνουσιν ἡμᾶς καὶ διαφεύγουσι 
πρὸς ἑτέροις τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντας· εἶτ’ αὖθις ἐπανῆλθε καὶ μεταθεῖ καὶ διώκει τῶν προϊεμένων ἕκαστον 
ἀναλεγόμενος· ᾗͅ ͅͅ καὶ λέλεκται, “νοῦς ὁρῇͅ ͅͅ καὶ νοῦς ἀκούει, τἄλλα κωφὰ καὶ τυφλά,” ὠς τοῦ περὶ τὰ ὄμματα καὶ 
ὦτα πάθους, ἂν μὴ παρῇͅ ͅͅ τὸ φρονοῦν, αἴσθησιν οὐ ποιοῦντος. 
81 Sharples translates τῶν προϊεμένων ἕκαστον as ‘each of the things that it cast away’. For προΐεμαι in the sense 
of ‘utter’ when used of sounds, which I prefer here, see LSJ9 s.v. B I 2. 
it is said that ‘Mind sees and hears, the rest are deaf and blind’, since the experience 
in the eyes and ears does not produce sensation if what thinks is not present. 
Given Strato’s reliance on phenomena associated with reading and listening to spoken 
discourse (λόγοι), he can hardly have been talking about animals in the original context from 
which this testimonium was taken. Taken by itself, Strato’s argument seems to point in the 
same direction as the one we have just been looking at, using evidence from everyday 
experience to support the notion that a common sensorium is needed to turn external stimuli 
into true perceptions: whereas he focused on phenomena associated with pain before, here he 
adduces the registering of meaning in rational discourse. Plutarch believes that Strato’s 
argument works against the Stoics in that, since perception cannot occur without the 
intellective faculty, and since animals have perception, they must also have the intellective 
faculty and therefore must be rational. But there is no reason to think that Strato believed that 
all animals have to be rational: in this case, he has evidently just selected human experiences 
as examples, and we should not conclude that he thought animals could read or talk. Again, it 
looks as if he is just interested in the common sensorium as the true locus of perception. All 
this ties in well with an additional report that he likened the sense-organs to openings through 
which the soul peeps out, an idea that is interestingly picked up by Lucretius.82  
 Again, I suggest the possibility that a Stoic discussion, framed in terms of an account 
of the hēgemonikon, was the source for the Placita entry on Strato concerning the space 
between the eyebrows. The idea that the true locus of perception is not the sense-organ in 
which the stimuli are received, but a central location where the stimuli are actually registered, 
is of course shared by the Stoics. In fact, this Stoic view is recorded elsewhere in the Placita, 
at 4.23, just before the entry on Strato and the location of the emotions and sensations in the 
hēgemonikon mentioned above.83 On my account, this is no accident: the Stoic source will 
have borrowed Stratonic arguments, but only for the conclusion that it is properly not the 
sense-organs that perceive, but the central location in which they are registered. A later 
doxographer, reading the Stratonic argument in a Stoic framework, and searching (because of 
that Stoic framework) for doxai regarding the location of the hēgemonikon, mistakenly 
picked up on the mention of the space between the eyebrows, and jumped to the wrong 
conclusion. This is just the sort of thing that I suggest happened to Herophilus and 
Erasistratus, and once again Chrysippus’ On the Soul seems an eminently plausible candidate 




                                                 
82 Fr. 61 Sharples = fr. 109 Wehrli (S.E. M. 7.348-50); cf. fr. 59 Sharples = fr. 108 Wehrli (Tert. DA 14.3-5). 
Lucretius argues against the view at 3.350-69, without naming Strato.  
83 Ps.-Plut. Plac. 4.23, Περὶ παθῶν σωματικῶν καὶ εἰ συναλγεῖ τούτοις ἡ ψυχή. οἱ Στωικοὶ τὰ μὲν πάθη ἐν τοῖς 
πεπονθόσι τόποις, τὰς δὲ αἰσθήσεις ἐν τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ (‘On bodily affections and whether the soul shares in 
suffering these. The Stoics [say that] the affections [take place] in the affected places, but the sensations [take 
place] in the hēgemonikon’). Strato’s compatible view (fr. 63A Sharples = fr. 110 Wehrli) is then listed after the 
contrasting Epicurean one.  
84 I am very grateful to all participants at the Symposium for discussion, especially Sylvia Berryman, Gábor 
Betegh, Charles Brittain, Katerina Ierodiakonou, Brad Inwood, Jaap Mansfeld, David Sedley, Teun Tieleman 
and John Wynne. Sincere thanks are also due to Orly Lewis and Geoffrey Lloyd for comments and criticism on 
various aspects of earlier versions of this paper.  
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